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Hume’s Conceivability Principle is one of the main pillars of his 
philosophical system. According to Hume, “Whatever we conceive is 
possible, at least in a metaphysical sense” (T Abstract 11)1). Compared with 
other well-known principles of his metaphysics, the importance of the 
Conceivability Principle does not seem to be thoroughly explored. In this 
paper, I will first outline the principle, and then clarify the fundamental role 
of the principle by placing it in the context of modern philosophy, and finally 
offer my solution to an interpretative problem that is disputed among Hume 
scholars. In the process of delineating these circumstances surrounding the 
principle, the fundamental character of Hume’s empiricism and scepticism 
will be clarified. This paper tries to provide a preliminary consideration for 
resolving intricate problems relating to the Conceivability Principle. 
1. Hume’s Four Basic Principles
Hume refers to the Conceivability Principle in several famous places. 
Let us briefly review the main topics where Hume relies on the principle to 
defend his theories. Here are some of them2). 
1) David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, David Fate Norton and Mary J. 
Norton (eds.), Oxford University Press, 2000, cited as “T”, followed by book, 
part, section, and paragraph number. 
2) D. Tycerium Lightner, “Hume on Conceivability and Inconceivability”, Hume 
Studies 23.1, 1997, pp. 114-115. According to Lightner, Hume touched upon 
the concept of conceivability 17 times in the Treatise and 3 time is An Abstract 
of a Book Lately Published. Tycerium (1997, p. 115), Bo Chen and Jingxian Liu, 
“Hume’s Conceivability Argument Reconsidered”, Axiomathes, 2019, 29: 544. 
https://davidhume.org/. Although Hume relies on the Conceivability Principle, 
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1. In the section on abstract ideas, Hume states, 
 “If this therefore be absurd in fact and reality, it must also be absurd 
in idea; since nothing of which we can form a clear and distinct idea is 
absurd and impossible” (T 1.1.7.6).
2. In the section where he discusses space and time, he states, 
 “’Tis an establish’d maxim in metaphysics, That whatever the mind clearly 
conceives includes the idea of possible existence, or in other words, that 
nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible. We can form the idea of a 
golden mountain, and from thence conclude that such a mountain may 
actually exist. We can form no idea of a mountain without a valley, and 
therefore regard it as impossible” (T 1.2.2.8). 
3. In the section of the ideas of being and external beings, he states,
 “The idea of existence, then, is the very same with the idea of what we 
conceive to be existent. To reflect on any thing simply, and to reflect 
on it as existent, are nothing different from each other. That idea, when 
conjoin’d with the idea of any object, makes no addition to it. Whatever 
we conceive, we conceive to be existent. Any idea we please to form 
is the idea of a being; and the idea of a being is any idea we please to 
form” (T 1.2.6.4).
4. In the discussion of the uniformity of nature, he states,
 “We can at least conceive a change in the course of nature; which 
sufficiently proves, that such a change is not absolutely impossible. 
To form a clear idea of any thing, is an undeniable argument for its 
possibility, and is alone a refutation of any pretended demonstration 
against it” (T 1.3.6.5).
5. In the discussion of the external objects, he states, 
 “If they appear not to have any particular place, they may possibly 
exist in the same manner; since whatever we conceive is possible” (T 
1.4.5.10). 
6. In his criticism of the substantiality of the mind, he states,
 “Our perceptions are all really different, and separable, and 
he does not meticulously mention it each time. 
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distinguishable from each other, and from every thing else, which we 
can imagine; and therefore ‘tis impossible to conceive, how they can 
be the action or abstract mode of any substance” (T 1.4.5.27).
As shown above, Hume appeals to the principle in central parts of every 
metaphysical topic he addresses. There is no doubt that the principle plays a 
crucial role in Hume’s philosophy. Therefore, by taking note of the principle, 
we can achieve a unified understanding of the topics of Hume’s metaphysics. 
Along with the Conceivability Principle, Hume offers three other principles 
that support his philosophy; the Copy Principle, the Separability Principle, 
and the Principle of the Association of Ideas3). These principles should be 
understood as setting a condition by which to define the range of what 
is conceivable. Let us review these principles one by one. The first and 
most fundamental principle is the Copy Principle: “all our simple ideas 
in their first appearance, are derived from simple impressions, which are 
correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent” (T 1.1.1.7). This 
thesis is Hume’s formulation of Locke’s empiricist position that there are 
no innate ideas, and all ideas originate in impressions (perceptions). Hume 
considers ideas a weakened form of impressions. There is no difference 
between impressions and ideas except for their vivacity. We can compound 
simple ideas freely to form complex ideas that our real experience cannot 
give, like when we construct the idea of a unicorn. But, although simple 
ideas are impossible without corresponding simple impressions, simple 
impressions may be possible without corresponding simple ideas4). 
As an empiricist, Hume treats ideas as imagistic, not abstract entities. 
Unlike his continental predecessors, he does not admit non-imagistic innate 
3) Don Garrett, “Hume’s Theory of Ideas”, in E.S. Radcliffe (ed.) A Companion to 
Hume, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008, pp. 41-57, Hume, London: Routldge, 
2015, pp. 43-50, “Reason, Normativity and Hume’s “Title Principles””, Oxford 
Handbook of Hume, Paul Russell (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020, 
pp. 32-53, Peter Kail, “Conceivability and Modality in Hume: A Lemma in an 
Argument in Defense of Skeptical Realism”, Hume Studies 29.1, 2003, pp. 43-61.
4) David Owen, “Hume and the Mechanics of Mind”, The Cambridge Companion to 
Hume, 2nd ed., David Fate Norton and Jaqueline Taylor (eds.), 2009, p. 74, note 5. 
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ideas. This is the basis for Hume’s method for acquiring a standard for valid 
ideas; we can trace those ideas to their original impressions when they 
are meaningful. Some complex ideas do not have a distinct impression as 
their empirical origin. Hume explains those ideas by the Principle of the 
Association of Ideas; human nature has a natural tendency to associate 
similar objects. When we perceive a particular object, we naturally associate 
it with other similar objects that we remember. As these experiences are 
so frequent, we naturally come to give a particular term to the group of 
similar objects. Whenever we perceive an object, we regard it as representing 
the whole group and call it by the term we have given to the group. The 
reverse operation functions, as well: whenever we hear a term, we almost 
automatically remember a typical member of the group. We compare the 
new object with it, and when we find enough similarity, we recognize the 
new object as a member of the group referred to by the term. The vital 
function of the Copy Principle with regard to the Conceivability Principle 
is that it presents the criterion by which we come to have ideas in the first 
instance. Empirical origin of ideas is the first condition of conceivability. In 
other words, ideas that are not at all involved in the empirical origin are 
inconceivable. 
Hume’s second basic principle is the Separability Principle. Hume refers 
to this principle when he attempts to prove that “the mind cannot form 
any notion of quantity or quality without forming a precise notion of the 
degrees of each” (T 1.1.7.3). Hume defines it as follows: “Whatever objects 
are different are distinguishable, and whatever objects are distinguishable 
are separable by the thought and imagination”, and the reverse proposition 
is also true; “whatever objects are separable are also distinguishable, and 
that whatever objects are distinguishable are also different” (ibid.). The 
Separability Principle can be understood as Hume’s application of the 
separability of substances to the theory of perceptions. An appropriate 
application of this principle leads to a result of great significance: the 
distinction between ideas of cause and ideas of effect. However, an erroneous 
application of this principle results in the denial of the distinction between 
the particular quality of things and the things themselves, e. g. “the precise 
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length of a line” from “the line itself” (T 1.1.7.3). While the former is possible, 
the latter is impossible in our experience. 
The important point we should bear in mind when we consider the 
Conceivability Principle is that the above three principles set the basic 
conditions for conceivability; first, the entities to be conceived are ideas that 
are derived from impressions, second, we should conceive ideas without 
breaching the Separability Principle, and third, we should conceive ideas 
following the principle of association. These conditions bind us when we 
conceive ideas. As Garrett mentions, “inferences from possibility in thought 
to possibility tout court are licensed by the Conceivability Principle”5). 
Therefore, if conceivability or inconceivability is asserted beyond those 
conditions, or in a way that contradicts those principles, those assertions 
will not be counted as legitimate in Hume’s philosophy. 
The relationship between the Copy Principle and the Conceivability 
Principle is especially important. The Copy Principle denies the existence 
of a simple idea that does not correspond to a corresponding simple 
impression. However, it does not specify what possible impression can exist 
that does not correspond to an idea. In Hume, the truth value of a belief is 
not determined by the congruence between separate ideas that compose a 
belief; belief can be produced from a single idea. In his argument about the 
existence, to conceive an idea can be a sufficient condition for the existence 
of its impression (T 1.2.6.2). Hume denied the conceivability of an idea of 
existence itself that does not accompany any particular impression or idea. 
The denial of the presence of an independent impression of existence is the 
condition for the possibility of simple ideas. In this way, the Copy Principle 
and the Conceivability Principle compensate for each other. Unlike the Copy 
Principle that explains the connections between impressions and ideas that 
stand in a relationship of cause and effect, the connection implied in the 
Conceivability Principle is not necessary but probable. Hume’s theory of 
causation as a probable relation between two kinds of impressions, is an 
instance of the application of the Conceivability Principle; when the custom 
5) Garrett (2015), p. 47. 
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of observing two similar kinds of events following one another is formed, 
it is conceivable that the similar pattern continues. However it remains to 
be a mere possibility because, apart from the psychological necessity, there 
is no logical connection between the two. Here, a question arises as to what 
distinguishes between conceivable and inconceivable. 
2. Relationship to the continental philosophy
We can undoubtedly highlight the originality and importance of Hume’s 
Conceivability Principle by placing it in a broader context of modern 
philosophy. Hume’s Conceivability Principle is not generally connected 
with any specific historical sources. However, my claim is that it is most 
fundamentally a ramification of the ontological argument of the existence of 
God because the Conceivability Principle focuses on the relationship between 
our mental entity and the real existence. Surely, Hume’s Conceivability 
Principle is not a direct reaction to the ontological demonstration itself but 
a critical response to its modern development from Descartes to his day. 
As the metaphysical problem of the ontological argument revolves 
around the dichotomy between essence (essentia) and existence (existentia), so 
does the Conceivability Principle. It is a problem regarding the relationship 
between what exists in the mind and what exists in reality6). Cartesian 
dualism set the framework for considering the relationship between mental 
contents and material actuality. When Hume wrote that the Conceivability 
Principle is established in metaphysics, he most probably had in mind 
Descartes’ argument7). According to Descartes, “it is just as much of a 
contradiction to think of God (that is, a supremely perfect being) lacking 
existence (that is, lacking a perfection), as it is to think of a mountain without 
6) See Alvin Plantinga, “Ontological arguments”, in “God, arguments for the 




7) Pierre Saint-Germier, “Conceivability, Inconceivability and Cartesian Modal 
Epistemology”, Symthese, 2018, 195: 4785. 
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a valley” (Meditation of First Principle, CSM II 46, AT VII 66)8). Hume is aware 
of this argument as he uses the same example of “mountain without a valley” 
as Descartes does (CSM I pp. 230-231, AT VIIIA 50). Descartes also writes 
that “it must be noted that possible existence is contained in the concept 
or idea of everything that we clearly and distinctly understand” (First Set 
of Replies, CSM II 83, AT VII 116). For Descartes, a clear and distinct idea of 
objects in the extra-mental world is actually instantiated as it can be assured 
by God’s veracity.
Descartes asserted the innateness of the theory of ideas. In order to 
propose the ontological demonstration of the existence of God, the vital 
abstract ideas must be innate and beyond any empirical challenges. Based 
on those innate ideas, the search for the most fundamental condition that 
makes all those conceptual constructions meaningful becomes possible. 
By the Cogito argument, Descartes established the standard of certain 
ideas that are just not possible. For Descartes, the certainty of ideas and 
the actuality of the ideas that are certain are different. Certain ideas can 
exist as themselves in mind, typical examples being those demonstrating 
mathematical truth. This background of Cartesian dualism posed a crucial 
difficulty. The difficulty is how to justify the correspondence between the 
two substances. Famously, in the 6th Meditation, Descartes argues that the 
existence of the body is guaranteed by neither sense nor imagination. There 
is still room for scepticism in that it is only deception on the part of the 
human mind. To remove this doubt, Descartes appeals to the veracity of 
God. It is only God who can deceive us into believing the existence of a 
body when, in fact, there is no corporeal or extended substance. However, 
as God is no deceiver, we can be assured that there is, in fact, a body as we 
8) J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch (eds. and trans.), 1985-1991, 
The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (Vol. I-II) [abbreviated as CSM I-II], 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. References to vol. I and II respectively 
are of the form “CSM I” or “CSM II” followed by the relevant page number. The 
CSM references are followed by references to the correspondening page in the 
standard twelve-volume edition of Descartes produced by Adam and Tannery; 
references to these pages are of the form “AT” followed by the relevant page 
number. 
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recognise it with clear and distinct perceptions. Descartes can assert this 
relationship between recognition and actuality and establish the role God 
plays in building their relationship. “I know that everything which I clearly 
and distinctly understand is capable of created by God so as to correspond 
exactly with my understanding of it” (CSM II 54, AT VII 78).
Let us note that the main point of Descartes’ argument is the limitation 
of the Conceivability Principle; what is merely conceivable is not in itself 
enough as a condition for truth. This is significant for Hume, for were it not 
for the sincerity of God or were it not for God himself, there would not be 
any guarantee of their correspondence, and it would be reduced to a mere 
possibility.
The history of modern philosophy attests to the fact that Cartesian 
dualism represents a further development of the mind-body problem. 
Spinoza, with his monism, made the most crucial first step regarding this 
problem. According to Spinoza, Descartes’ assertion created difficulty 
because he used the certainty of Cogito as grounds for the existence of mind 
as a substance. Descartes first established substance as that of self, then 
proceeded to establish the substance of the body as having certainty as a 
secondary consequence. In contrast to Descartes, Spinoza thought that mind 
and body were not entitled to claim the status of having substance because 
they were the creations of God. Instead, there can be only one substance, 
Deus sive Natura. Spinoza argued that it is impossible to know that there 
is more than one substance that can share the same attributes because 
we cannot recognise a substance other than through its attributes (Ethica 
part 1, prop. 5)9). Furthermore, since the same attributes refer to the same 
substance, we cannot distinguish different substances without presupposing 
that the difference of modes signifies the difference in substance. However, a 
difference of modes does not indicate a difference in their attributes through 
which alone substance can be known. Therefore, if there can only be one 
9) Carl Gebhardt (ed.), Spinoza Opera, 4 vols., Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1925. 
Samuel Shirley (trans.), Spinoza: Complete Works, Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002.
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actuality, our conception of that actuality is necessarily what is real10). 
Spinoza claims that there is a correspondence between the attributes 
of thinking and extension. As they are just two aspects of the same 
entity, so they must correspond with one another. The logical conclusion 
of this ontological assertion is significant. The mental representation 
is the only description of the actuality. For each mental mode, there is 
only one extension-mode. Hence comes the most robust assertion of the 
necessitarianism: actuality is thoroughly rational. We can trace the sequences 
of the world by tracing logical sequences without being conditioned by God’s 
veracity, as was the case with Descartes. Everything occurs as a necessary 
expression of God’s only actuality. As there is only one actuality, its correct 
mental representation is determinate11). Therefore, we can take Spinoza’s 
theory as signifying the identification of possibility with necessity; what is 
conceivable is obviously possible, and what is genuinely possible is real, for 
if what is possible is not real, it was not possible after all. Hume apparently 
intends a critical appropriation of Spinoza in his Conceivability Principle. 
In our common world view our actuality does not seem to be the only 
possibility for us. Hume thought it necessary to recover the common sense 
idea of possibility from Spinoza’s necessitarianism12). After Spinoza, Leibniz 
famously criticized both Cartesian ontological proof of the existence of God 
and Spinoza’s identification of possibility and necessity13). It is obvious that 
10) As Tamar Gendler and John Hawthorne argue, Descartes and Hume explain the 
relationship between reality and thinking in an opposite direction; Descartes 
starts from reality and Hume the other way around. Tamar Gendler and John 
Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002, p. 15. 
11) Hegel developed this thesis into the thesis that “what is rational is real and what 
is real is rational”. ( G. W. F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 
7, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,1986, p. 24). His historical dialectics is founded 
on this thesis that was to be further developed in the materialistic dialectics by 
Karl Marx. 
12) Michael Della Rocca, “Playing with Fire: Hume, Rationalism, and a little bit of 
Spinoza”, Oxford Handbook of Spinoza, Michael Della Rocca (ed.), Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017, pp. 465-481.
13) Barry Loewer, Leibniz and the Ontological Argument, Philosophical Studies 34, 
86
Hume had those continental development regarding conceivability in mind 
when he refers to the concept14).
3. Conceivability and Inconceivability
Hume’s Conceivability Principle has produced many disagreements15). 
There is a famous controversy regarding the interpretation of the principle 
of whether inconceivability implies impossibility for Hume (call this the 
Inconceivability Principle)16). Let us consider the criteria of conceivability 
by considering this controversy whether Hume positively asserts the 
Inconceivability Principle. The first point is that possibility and impossibility 
are not symmetrical in terms of the modality; Hume uses the notion of 
possibility as synonymous with probability, but there is no probability 
within impossibility. The possibility recognized in the Conceivability 
Principle is an open concept in that what is possible may not be actual. 
However, if the Inconceivability Principle is true and universally applicable, 
then what is inconceivable must necessarily be impossible. Hume takes the 
necessity expressed here as illegitimate, because necessity can only be a 
psychological concept and to assert necessity beyond human experience is 
subject to skepticism. Let us remember that for Spinoza, the possibility was 
1978, pp. 105-109, James Patrick Downey, “Commentary on The Possibility of 
God”, Faith and Philosophy 4.2, 1987, pp. 202-206, David Blumenfeld, “Leibniz’s 
Ontological and Cosmological Arguments”, in The Cambridge Companion to 
Leibniz, Nicholas Jolley (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, 
Wolfgang Lenzen, “Leibniz’s Ontological Proof of the Existence of God and the 
Problem of Impossible Objects”, Logica Universalis 11, 2017, p. 86.
14) British tradition, especially Berkeley, deeply influenced Hume’s Conceivability 
Principle, but I do not discuss it in this paper. See Thomas Holden, “Berkeley 
on Inconceivability and Impossibility”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
118.1, 2019, pp. 107-122.
15) Lightner (1997), Saint-Germier (2018), Albert Casullo, “Conceivability and 
Possibility”, Ratio: An International Journal of analytic Philosophy 17, 1975, pp. 118-
121. 
16) Bo Chen and Jingxian Liu (2019), 29: 541-559. Garrett asserts that Hume does 
not endorse the Inconceivability Principle except for contradictory propositions. 
Garett (2015), p. 49. 
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a necessity, and there was no room for liberty. Hume may have been aware 
of this because his project aimed to present a notion of possibility that was 
compatible with the common usage of the term. Hume criticized rationalist’s 
conception of liberty for failing to be compatible with common sense. 
Scepticism underlies all discussions that involve the Conceivability 
Principle, which explains Hume’s ambiguous position regarding the 
connection of inconceivability and impossibility17). With scepticism, one 
can assert that conceivability implies possibility, but one cannot decide 
that inconceivability signifies impossibility. In the argument concerning the 
existence of a vacuum, Hume discusses the problem of whether there is 
nothing that can be the object of our senses. He finds no decisive argument 
on the matter of the existence of a vacuum.
If we carry our enquiry beyond the appearances of objects to the senses, 
I am afraid, that most of our conclusions will be full of scepticism 
and uncertainty. Thus if it be ask’d, whether or not the invisible and 
intangible distance be always full of body, or of something that by an 
improvement of our organs might become visible or tangible, I must 
acknowledge, that I find no very decisive arguments on either side; tho’ 
I am inclin’d to the contrary opinion, as being more suitable to vulgar 
and popular notions (T 1.2.5.26n)18). 
Here, if the problem is whether things that we cannot imagine at this 
moment are impossible, Hume clearly gives a negative answer. Unlike 
the case of the conceivability-possibility relationship, we cannot decide 
something to be impossible by our imagination. The gap between possibility 
and actuality must be bridged by future experiences. If this is not admitted, 
Hume’s theory is none other than rationalism. But just as non-existence 
17) John P. Wright, “Hume’s Rejection of the Theory of Ideas”, History of Philosophy 
Quarterly 8, 1991, pp. 149-162, R. S. Woolhouse, “From Conceivability to 
Possibility”, Ratio: An International Journal of Analytic Philosophy 14, 1972, 
pp. 144-154. 
18) Lightner (1997), p. 150.
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cannot be empirically demonstrated, impossibility cannot be verified by 
experience. Therefore, the problem of approving the inconceivability as 
impossibility is to depreciate the essential role experience plays in Hume’s 
philosophy. 
It is appropriate to remember what is called “Hume’s fork”: Hume 
distinguishes “relations of ideas” and “matters of fact”19). This distinction 
corresponds to the distinction between “truths of reason” and “truths 
of facts” in Leibniz. To take an example of relations of ideas, the sum of 
interior angles is two right angles in Euclidean geometry. Here, what is 
inconceivable is obviously impossible. In the cases of truths of reason, 
there is no gap between subject and predicate. Thus, the inconceivable-
impossible relationship is problematic in cases of matters of fact; truths of 
reason are definite and are known only by reasoning, while matters of fact 
are contingent, even though they also have truth value. 
Thomas Reid, famously criticized Hume’s Conceivability Principle by 
saying that there were many cases where what is conceivable is impossible20). 
Reid criticizes the Conceivability Principle in the following ways:
The axiom, therefore, amounts to this: every proposition of which 
you understand meaning distinctly, is possible. I am persuaded, that 
I understand as distinctly the meaning of this proposition--- Any two 
sides of a triangle are together equal to the third, --- as of this,--- Any two 
sides of a triangle are together greater than the third, yet the first of these is 
impossible (EIP, chap. 4, sec. 3, p. 275)21).
19) Peter Millican, “Hume’s Fork, and his Theory of Relations”, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 95.1, 2017, pp. 1-65. 
20) Albert Casullo, “Reid and Mill on Hume’s conceivability”, Analysis 39, 1979, 
pp. 212-219, Lewis Powell, “How to Avoid Mis-Reiding Hume’s Maxim of 
Conceivability”, The Philosophical Quarterly 63, 2013, pp. 105-119.
21) Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Power of Man (Philadelphia: Butler and 
Co, 1878, p. 275), https://archive.org/details/10edessaysoninte00reiduoft/
page/274 (Accessed 05/Jan./2020), Albert Casullo (1979), p. 212, Powell (2013), 
pp. 105-119. 
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Reid takes understanding the meaning of a proposition to be sufficient for 
Hume’s conceivability22). However, Hume apparently did not mean the mere 
comprehensibility of a proposition as being a condition of conceivability23). 
By eliminating the comprehensibility of a proposition as a criterion for 
conceivability, the latter becomes clearer. 
Reid’s criticism commits an error of mistaking the relation of ideas for 
matters of fact; the proposition that any two sides of a triangle are together 
equal to the third is known to be false as a relation of ideas. Therefore, 
Reid’s example is not an example of conceivability in Hume’s sense. It is also 
inappropriate to identify Hume’s inconceivability was implying impossibility 
from the perspective of his religious theory24). In his Dialogues concerning 
Natural Religion (1779), many arguments suggest the inconceivability of 
God’s existence. 
Any particle of matter, ‘tis said, may be conceived to be annihilated; 
and any form may be conceived to be altered. Such an annihilation or 
alteration, therefore, is not impossible. But it seems a great partiality 
not to perceive, that the same argument extends equally to the Deity, 
so far as we have any conception of him; and that the mind can at 
least imagine him to be non-existent, or his attributes to be altered. It 
must be some unknown, inconceivable qualities, which can make his 
non-existence appear impossible, or his attributes unalterable: And no 
reason can be assigned, why these qualities may not belong to matter. 
As they are altogether unknown and inconceivable, they can never 
22) Albert Casullo (1979), pp. 212ff. Casullo points out that there is a difference 
between understanding and conceiving a proposition. 
23) For a more substantial discussion on Reid’s criticism, see Casullo (1979), Powell 
(2013).
24) For a consideration of the significance of the Conceivability Principle in Hume’s 
Dialogues, see Naoki Yajima, “Why did not Hume become an Atheist?: The 
Influence of Butler on Hume’s Dialogues”, Journal of Scottish Philosophy 16.3, 2017, 
pp. 249-260. 
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be proved incompatible with it (Hume, 2007 [1779], part 9, para.7)25). 
Here, it is asserted that God’s inconceivable quality may belong to matter. 
It need not concern us who makes this claim in Hume’s fictitious work. The 
point is that Hume considers this assertion something meaningful. To say the 
least, inconceivable does not mean impossible. Also, Hume nowhere asserts 
the impossibility of God’s existence because God is inconceivable. More 
crucially, there is a sense that the Inconceivability Principle works contrary 
to the Conceivability Principle. The whole point of the Conceivability 
Principle is to vindicate a notion of possibility that requires very little 
metaphysical comitment. Even though a contradictory thing cannot exist, 
not all inconceivable things are obviously contradictory. The fact that Hume 
stays open on the connection between inconceivability and impossibility 
lends another circumstantial evidence that he did not have such implications 
about the principle. 
4. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I have examined Hume’s Conceivability Principle in 
relation to other basic principles and also in comparison with his continental 
predecessors. As has been discussed and confirmed above, Hume appeals 
to the principle in all important topics of his metaphysics. Therefore, we 
can illuminate Hume’s system by focusing on this principle. We have 
demonstrated that the Conceivability Principle provides Hume’s definition 
of possibility as a condition of human experience. Then, we considered 
the controversy regarding the inconceivability thesis. Most importantly, 
we contrasted Hume’s principle with Spinoza’s rationalist thesis that 
what is reasonable is possible and what is possible is necessary. Hume 
argued against Spinoza’s necessitarianism and the denial of liberty with 
his principle. Conceivability is a natural and open concept in that what 
conceivability means, or how to decide whether something is conceivable or 
25) David Hume, Dialogues concerning Natural Religion and other writings, Dorothy 
Coleman (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 65.
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not, is left to be discussed among the relevant groups of people. In this sense, 
Hume’s philosophy is related to public scrutiny and its discursive practice. 
Although this paper is only a brief overview of the background of the critical 
principle of Hume, as well as problems relating to it, we have at least shown 
the importance of Hume’s Conceivability Principle which deserves further 
consideration for the analysis of Hume’s entire metaphysics26).
26) This paper is based on a presentation I made at The 6th International Forum of 
Shino-Japanese Philosophy, at Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, on the 22nd 




This paper discusses Hume’s Conceivability Principle, according to 
which whatever we conceive is possible, at least in a metaphysical sense. 
Although this principle is not thoroughly argued by commentators, 
Hume relies on this principle in almost all significant arguments of his 
metaphysics. The principle is involved in the crucial relationship between 
mind and reality of modern philosophy. Therefore, it is possible to find a 
relevant counterargument of this principle in metaphysics from Descartes 
to Berkeley. This paper focuses narrowly on the comparison between 
Hume vis Descartes, and Hume vis Spinoza, and elucidates that Hume’s 
innovation of this principle intends the transformation of the concept of 
necessity, and development of the concept of probability. This paper also 
offers a possible solution to a famous interpretative problem regarding the 
relationship between what is inconceivable and impossibility, and with it, the 
fundamental character of Hume’s empiricism and scepticism will be clarified. 
This paper thus aims to be a preliminary consideration for clarifying the 
intricate connection between the Conceivability Principle and Hume’s entire 
metaphysics.
